IamnotandcannotpretendtobeaRomanticist
and so cannot claim to know in any detail the discrete rules of scholarly competence that govern the field, the subdisciplinary bylaws that hold membership in this, as in any, intellectual community minimally conditional on some shared experiences of reading. Nor am I interested, here, in adding an item to the list of texts that all good, self-respecting Romanticists should know. Rather, it is precisely because, whatever my ignorance of the current state of the Romanticist contract, I feel fairly sure that a knowledge of Harriet Jacobs's Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl is not obligatory in the field that I want to start with it. 1 There is the matter of dates to begin with. Originally published in , Jacobs's text (written under the pseudonym Linda Brent) falls a few good decades outside the historical moment with which Romanticism is usually associated and that, generally, allows it to designate not only a shared (if never quite agreed on) set of ideological, epistemological, or aesthetic protocols but a reasonably stable period concept. And then, too, there is the problem of genre or mode. As Valerie Smith has argued, the primary influence on Jacobs's text would appear to be the domestic, sentimental novel (whose situationally compromised but virtuous heroine, as Smith further suggests, both provides a model for the narrative of sexual menace at the heart of Incidents and proves itself radically inadequate to the experiences of sexual violence Jacobs reveals to be definitive of the life of the ''slave girl''). 2 And if there is a generic allegiance to something other than the sentimental novel in the passage I cite it would certainly seem to be to the Gothic, though again, even gothic terror seems flippant in relation to the racial terror that drove Jacobs, in the ''incident'' she here relates, to go into hiding from her predatory master, Dr. Flint, in the garret of her grandmother's shed. But Romanticist I nevertheless want to argue this chapter from the Incidents is, though I probably would not have noticed it if I had not been struck, first, by how frequently, if variously, the texts I am supposed to know (''postcolonial,'' ''diasporic,'' ''postmodern'') wander into seemingly ''Romantic'' territory, and, subsequently, in the process of editing this collection, by registering for the first time the allusion that frames this chapter of Jacobs's text. The chapter is entitled ''The Loophole of Retreat,'' and, as Kevis Goodman's contribution to this collection reminds us, that phrase is not original to Jacobs but occurs in one of the more famous lines from William Cowper's  poem The Task ('' 'Tis pleasant through the loopholes of retreat / To peep at such a world.'') 3
What are we to make of this repetition? The phrase is unusual enough that it seems unlikely that both Cowper and Jacobs (and more to the point, Jacobs, writing three-quarters of a century after Cowper) would have generated it at random. Had Jacobs read The Task prior to writing Incidents? I cannot answer definitively. Certainly, as someone whose education had familiarized her with the conventions of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century English literature she could be expected to have known of Cowper, whose collaboration with John Newton on the Olney Hymns together with his  poem ''The Negro's Complaint'' (which, set to music and multiply reproduced in pamphlet form, became the virtual ballad of the Abolition movement in England) had made him (together with Robert Southey and Anna Letitia Barbauld) one of the most celebrated English poets to have addressed the problem of transatlantic slavery. The Task, too, is not devoid of interest in, and protest against, the peculiar institution (''Slaves cannot breathe in England; if their lungs / Receive our air, that moment they are free, / They touch our country, and their shackles fall''), and on the basis of this circumstantial and allusive evidence I find it hard to believe that Jacobs could not have had Cowper in mind when she published her chapter on her garret confinement under that odd phrase. But if Jacobs was thinking of Cowper, possibly even paying tribute to him, what might it have meant for her to be thinking of his ''loopholes of retreat'' rather than, for instance, that celebrated line from ''The Negro's Complaint'': ''Still in thought as free as ever''? 4 Or what might it have meant for her, perhaps, to be thinking of both poems, to have found that the condition of being ''Still in thought'' and ''free as ever'' (which, legally, through this point in her life meant ''never'') was coincident with finding a Romantic ''loophole'' through which to ''peep'' at the ''world''? What, indeed, might such a determination to ''retreat'' not only into the protected space of her grandmother's garret but, belatedly, into a Romantic habit of worldly spectation betoken both for Jacobs's text and for the worldly ''afterlife'' of Romanticism beyond its designated historical period and outside its customary archive of texts? This is an introduction to a collection and not an essay within it, so I will not indulge myself by attempting to offer anything like comprehensive answers to these questions. Rather-though I will return briefly to Jacobs's text and its Cowper pretext at the conclusion to this introduction-what I want to note is that it is questions of this sort that have inspired the collection at hand. Jacobs is not alone; nor is Cowper the only ''Romantic'' to survive the moment that produced him; nor is the deferred or longdistance rewriting of one or other recognizably Romantic figure the only way in which, over the course of the past two centuries, Romantic ideologies, epistemologies, and aesthetics have been rendered globally vagrant, historically untimely, perversely resistant to the ''numerical determinism,'' as Wai Chee Dimock here puts it, of the ''Newtonian'' period concepts by which we make sense of history. The essays in this collection are, of course, not the first to notice this Romantic unwillingness to honor conventional unities of time and place; nor, in many instances, is this the first thing the collection's contributors have had to say about this phenomenon. In the early s, thanks in large part to David Simpson and Alan Liu, it became if not quite a commonplace then certainly an influential strand of critical thought to identify the postmodern (with its various devotions to the anecdote, the local, the locale, the detail, the nontotalizing, the singular, and the politics of melancholy) as, among many other things, a belated or neo-Romanticism. 5 More recently, James Chandler has reminded us-or, for many of us, taught us-that our very conception of the ''contemporary'' has a Romantic provenance, as does historicism, our dominant method for constructing and making sense of present and historical ''moments'' and the political events, social dynamics, and aesthetic artifacts such contemporaneities are understood to encompass. 6 If, as Chandler's work suggests, contemporary understandings of the ''contemporary'' are Romantically noncontemporaneous with themselves, then so too, Mary Poovey has suggested, are contemporary understandings of fact, system, and epistemology. As she notes in the concluding chapter of her magisterial A History of the Modern Fact, ''Whether it takes the form of Ferdinand de Saussure's claim that signs are arbitrary, Jacques Lacan's definition of the ego as lack, Jean Baudrillard's fascination with simulation's ability to end all original reference, or Slavoj Žižek's celebration of the 'meaningless traces' that thrust meaning production onto analysis itself, the postmodernist conviction that the systems of knowledge humans create constitute the only source of meaning is [not only] gradually displacing both the problem of induction and all the variants of the modern fact'' but is formally repetitive of the counterinductive and hence countermodern epistemology ''adumbrated by the romantic poets' turn away from phenomenal particulars and toward the mind that contemplates those things.'' 7
This last point, needless to say, constitutes not only a synthetic characterization of postmodern modes of knowledge production but an equally generalized typification of a Romantic conception of knowledge. In either case, Poovey's departicularized Romanticism and her autoreferential and counterinductive (Romantic) postmodernism appear to be the very antithesis of, say, Liu's hyperdetailed Romanticism and transcendently detailed (if equally Romantic) postmodernism. The point, of course, is not that either Liu or Poovey has it right while the other does not, or even that the internal heterogeneity of both the Romantic and the postmodern render both excessively susceptible to selective transcoding in one another's select key-terms, but, rather, that the very heterogeneity of these two objects of study, and the ease with which that heterogeneity allows two deeply informed scholars to apparently say the same thing (that the postmodern is a belated or neo-Romanticism) while in fact meaning two very different things (that the postmodern is Romantic by virtue of its hyperparticularism; that the postmodern is Romantic by virtue of its disinterest in empirical particulars) should lead us to suggest that the original statement (''The postmodern is a belated or neo-Romanticism'') is not an answer to a question (''What is postmodernism?'') but an invitation to ask a series of others. Perhaps not so much, What is Romanticism? as, How many are there? Where have they traveled over the long history of modernity? Where are they now? How are they now? How did they get from there to here? and, What, now, are we to make of them and of a now that seems not so much contradictorily as multiply Romantic?
Multiple Romanticisms; multiple modernities; multiple postmodernities: the essays that follow engage and transcode such multiplicities-as they also pose or answer such questions as I have framed-in a variety of ways that I do not wish to impoverish by summary. So, instead, as a means of learning from them rather than advertising them, let me return by way of four passages drawn from my customary archive to the questions I put to Jacobs's Incidents. Each of the passages I have in mind touches in some or other way on what, following Robert Farris Thompson and Paul Gilroy, we have taken to calling the black Atlantic. But other than sharing that very broad and very diverse rubric, they appear to have nothing else in common. The question I want now to ask of them (and implicitly also to put to both the Romanticist and non-Romanticist readers of this collection) is whether we have something to learn of them by reimagining them as, also, commonly Romantic and thus expressive of the value Romantic specialists and nonspecialists alike might find in attending to the untimely, vagrant, and worldly afterlives and other-lives of what is not, after all, an exclusively European late-eighteenth-and early-nineteenth-century phenomenon.
The four passages come in pairs: the first two address the common Romantic topos of cognitive indolence, the second two are broadly elegiac. Here are the first two-one, again, from Jacobs (from the concluding paragraph of ''The Loophole of Retreat'': she recalls peering through a hole she has bored in the wall of the garret), the other from the title story of the South African writer Njabulo Ndebele's  collection Fools and Other Stories.
O, those long gloomy days, with no object for my eye to rest upon, and no thoughts to occupy my mind, except the dreary past and the uncertain future! I was thankful when there came a day sufficiently mild for me to wrap myself up and sit at the loophole to watch the passers by. Southerners have the habit of stopping and talking in the streets, and I heard many conversations not intended to meet my ears. I heard slavehunters planning how to catch some poor fugitive. . . . Very rarely did any one suggest that I might be in the vicinity. Had the least suspicion rested on my grandmother's house, it would have been burned to the ground. But it was the last place they thought of.Yet there was no place, where slavery existed, that could have afforded me so good a place of concealment. 8 I was awakened, late in the afternoon, by a light knock on the door. I slowly awoke from a long uncertainty about whether I had been awake or asleep. Since I had told myself it was the day for thinking, I had willed myself to think: but my mind had been unable to focus on any specific thing. I had willed without direction. And I had become aware that I did not really know how to think; how to induce the mind to work; that it was really possible to be dedicated without any real aims to be conscious of. . . . Thinking about thinking, I had been thinking. I had smiled and then closed my eyes and tried to think about something concrete. . . . For such a long time. Was I thinking or not? Was I asleep or awake? It was the light knock at the door that brought me to full consciousness.
There was a little boy at the door. He must have been about seven years old, and he wore only a dirty pair of black trousers. . . . As I looked at him, it struck me suddenly that he was the thing I should have been thinking of. As he stood at the door, he seemed such a large part of the world just behind him, for he was bigger than it, and had blotted most of it out with his body. His presence there seemed to be the beginning of questions. 9
And here are the next two-the first, from the epilogue to the Martiniquan novelist Patrick Chamoiseau's Texaco (), recounts the narrator's final visit to the ''Doum'' (a thickly vegetated section of Fort-de-France's shantytown that the text associates with indigenous magic and vernacular folk wisdom) in search of a ''Mentoh,'' a sort of living embodiment, and organic intellectual, of the folk tradition of the slave past; the second is from the dedication to Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx.
Penetrating the Doum, I found it deserted. Abandoned. I had been in so many places of Power, that I had acquired an immediate intuition for them. In my daily life, I detected around me so many cultural ruins in our mute countryside, so many gradual mummifications in the land all around, that I could at any point, before a hutch, a spot, a landscape, a river mouth, perceive a historical presence, stricken with staggering wear and tear. The Doum was dead: nothing could be done. . . .The Mentohs had always mustered our collective imaginings. They had imprinted upon them a convergence-a coherence. Out of the scattering of Carib, African, European, Chinese, Indian, Levantine . . . , they fixed the fibers for a good rope. . . . The disappearance of our Mentohs was revealing (oh silent pain) the domination of our spirit by new means unknown to traditional resistance. The boot, the sword, the rifle, or the banking powers of Occidental Being were no longer a threat to the peoples, the erosion of differences was. 10
One name for another, a part for the whole: the historic violence of Apartheid can always be rendered as a metonymy. In its past as well as in its present. By diverse paths (condensation, displacement, expression, or representation), one can always decipher through its singularity so many other kinds of violence going on in the world. At once part, cause, effect, example, what is happening there translates what takes place here, always here, wherever one is and wherever one looks, closest to home. Infinite responsibility, therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good conscience.
But one should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure, not even an exemplary figure in the logic of an emblem, a rhetoric of the flag or of martyrdom. A man's life, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol. And this is precisely what a proper name should always name. . . . Allow me to salute Chris Hani and to dedicate this lecture to him. 11
Let me begin at the end, with Derrida and Chris Hani, the assassinated South African communist leader whom Derrida invokes, recognizes, salutes at the beginning of Specters of Marx, and who, thus, is in some senses the text's first and most abiding specter, the African ghost who most haunts and ''figures'' Derrida's late-twentieth-century ''state[ment] of the debt,'' his ''work of mourning,'' his conjuring of a ''new international.'' I do not doubt the sincerity of Derrida's salute, but it also cannot have escaped most readers that that salutation, that desire at once to honor and to speak with or to the dead man (''The more life there is, the graver the specter of the other becomes, the heavier in its imposition. And the more the living have to answer for it. To answer for the dead, to respond to the dead. To correspond and have it out with obsessive haunting. . . . nothing is more serious and nothing is more true) is at once strategically useful, rather askance both to the argument of Specters and to the spirit of Derrida's larger enterprise, and oddly reminiscent of the desire that frames two of the now canonical elaborations of contemporary historicist thought: Stephen Greenblatt's Shakespearean Negotiations (''I began with the desire to speak with the dead'') and Fredric Jameson's The Political Unconscious (which identifies its project, and that of a more encompassing materialist historiography, with the determination to ''give us an adequate account of the essential mystery of the past, which, like Tiresias drinking the blood, is momentarily returned to life and warmth [by the historicist operation] and allowed once more to speak, and deliver its long-forgotten message in surroundings utterly alien to it''). 12 Derrida, Jameson, Greenblatt: there are, of course, any number of other trios one could assemble as representative of the major currents of contemporary critical thought, but these three will do quite nicely, at least as three of the more currently influential members of the masculine elegiac tradition.
To identify Greenblatt, Jameson, and Derrida as elegists is, of course, a little willful. But perhaps only a little. Alan Liu has elsewhere suggested that in its untiring exhumations of the ''lost object'' of history, new historicism assumes a ''habit (matched by that of Jameson mourning the loss of 'cognitive mapping' and Habermas the loss of 'lifeworld') [that] is the flip side of mania in Freud's schema: a mourning so existential as to be comparable to melancholia.'' 13 And Walter Benn-Michaels, in a characteristically gadflyish essay, has detected in both the ''new historicism'' and deconstruction something very much like an elegiac conjuring (''For you who never was there'') of the lost historical past. 14 It is not, though, Thomas Gray and his brother elegists that I ultimately want to suggest haunt Greenblatt, Jameson, and Derrida but another set of Romantic precursors that ghosts their work and makes its presence so forcefully present in Derrida's salute to Chris Hani. Not Gray, then, but Sir Walter Scott; and not elegy but eighteenth-century sensibility discourse, Smithian sentiment theory, the historical novel, and the Romantic politics of friendship. For eighteenth-century sensibility (like, I am suggesting, the sentimental politics of late-twentieth-century deconstruction and historicism, both Marxist and ''new'') is partially, as Julie Ellison has argued, a masculine politics of recognition (of suffering nobility), but it is also a mode of worldly interestedness in global systems of inequality and a reimagining of global politics as an invitation to geopolitical friendship. 15 Sensibility is also, as Ian Duncan has previously indicated and as he suggests again in his contribution to this collection, foundational to the emergence of the historical novel (at least as Scott framed that genre of Romantic discourse) and, as Chandler has further detailed, thus, also, genealogically dispositive (if not determinative) of a contemporary historicism that traces itself through Jameson's reception of Lukacs and Lukacs's reception of Scott back to the work of Adam Smith. But still: Jameson and Adam Smith? Derrida and Sir Walter Scott? What truly odd nightmares of past generations to prey like ghosts on the minds of the living.
In any absolute sense of one-to-one correspondences the questions certainly invite a no. But also, in a more conversational, epistolary, or call-andresponse sense of correspondence, a yes. For if history always repeats itself with a difference, it also repeats itself. By which I mean that it endures, that, as Jameson himself has argued (as, indeed, is virtually the central methodological argument of The Political Unconscious), the present is always nonsynchronous with itself, always still working out at the level of genre, if nothing else, the unresolved ideological contradictions of prior ages. 16 That this is the case, that the present is irredeemably haunted, that the life of the present is always, also, a living out of the afterlife of the not-in-factpast ''past'' is, of course, not a conviction original to the postmodern or to Derrida (even if his Specters of Marx is our most elaborate recent exploration of that proposition). It is, rather, a paradigmatically Romantic article of faith. Indeed, as Thomas Pfau's and Wai Chee Dimock's contributions to this collection remind us, to speak of the ''afterlives of Romanticism'' is to risk an entirely Romantic tautology. One might as well say the afterlife of the afterlife-ly or, in Derridean parlance, to speak of the haunting of the haunted, the reapparition of the reapparent, the appearance as if (and only as if ) for the first time of that which reappears.
Paying his debts to Marx (or, at least, demanding that we see him thus indebted) is Derrida thus also revealing a debt to a lyric mode of Romantic historical consciousness in which, as Pfau has it, the subject is always ''the unwitting vessel of its own past''? Unwittingly vesseling that lyric Romantic past is Derrida, in his very Marxianism, further indebted to the Romantic wing of the Scottish Enlightenment? Marx himself certainly wrestled with Adam Smith, and if for many of us it seems as if he won the battle with the political economist it remains unclear whether he, and those, like Jameson and Derrida, who count themselves as in some or other way faithful to his ''spirit,'' was or have been entirely able to throw off the more sympathetic influence of the theorist of Moral Sentiments and his novelistic inheritors. I do not want to push the suggestion too far. But still there is the matter of that entirely anomalous and utterly representative dedication, that decisively indecisive masterpiece of ''undecidability/decision'' in which Derrida allows himself to read Chris Hani's death as simultaneously singular and exemplary, simultaneously figurative and properly nominative. ''Infinite responsibility'' indeed. An infinite responsibility, in this case, simultaneously entertained and not deferred. Derrida risks the proper name. For which I can do nothing but applaud him while also wondering whether this is not the one thing a programmatically antiontologizing fidelity to the ''specter'' of Marx cannot permit itself ? Standing over Hani's grave, Derrida, it occurs to me, salutes a friend only to rebuke himself for betraying, with that salute, the spirit of his epistemological convictions. Is this Romantic? Think perhaps not so much of Wordsworth on his return from France as of Edward Waverly, that prototypically undecided representative of the historical novel, whose typically romance posture (as Duncan has sketched it) is further representative of what Chandler calls the Romantic ''type'': the belated historical spectator who stands sympathetic witness to scenes of historical suffering; registers his friendship with the vanquished; provisionally reverses Marx's injunction to ''let the dead bury the dead'' by determining, instead, ''to let the living revive the dead''; 17 but then, ultimately, finding himself unable to sustain a fully melancholy devotion to the irreducible singularity and unexchangeability of the slain, moves mournfully and undecidedly on.
Hence And perhaps it is that very multiplicity of the African living and dead with whom Derrida is entering into correspondence that suggests to him that responsibility (and corresponsibility) is restless difference; and that might suggest to us that in this moment of its geopolitical afterlife, so too is Romanticism. Though that should come as no surprise. For to regard Romanticism as the safeguard, the preserve, the refuge of difference in the face of a homogenizing, dedifferentiating, and synchronizing modernity is to put an entirely familiar gloss on the phenomenon (one that, it might be noted, both informs Michael Lowy and Robert Sayre's recent Romanticism against the Tide of Modernity-a revisionary account that treats Romanticism less as an aesthetic movement or a period concept than as a long-durational counterdiscourse on and of modernity, a melancholy weltanschauung ''co-extensive with capitalism itself ''-and, as Lowy and Sayre and Pfau point out, helps to explain Romanticism's otherwise puzzling reactionary-to-revolutionary ideological range). 19 But if Romanticism is thus, arguably, difference, is difference Romantic? And in what way? The passage I have cited from Chamoiseau's Texaco provides some clues. Like Derrida's ''dedication'' it is, after its own fashion, broadly elegiac. But what it mourns is not a man but a concept, indeed the concept of difference itself: ''The disappearance of our Mentohs was revealing (oh silent pain) the domination of our spirit by new means unknown to traditional resistance. The boot, the sword, the rifle, or the banking powers of Occidental Being were no longer a threat to the peoples, the erosion of differences was.'' But this is not just any difference, it is a determinate difference, a creole difference. Though again, in one of the countless ironies of history, this creole difference is itself the product of a historical dedifferentiation, a braiding or roping together of differences (''Carib, African, European, Chinese, Indian, Levantine . . .'') in one common cord and (to add one melancholy twist to this now cross-Atlantic strand of Romanticism) under one common proper name: creolite, as Chamoiseau identifies it in his coauthored manifesto Éloge de la créolité. 20
But if, in the impulse to the proper name, Derrida might detect a melancholy will-to-ontologize in this vagrant and belated Romanticism, then creolite also signifies something else. As Edouard Glissant, Chamoiseau's chief philosophical influence, indicates, creolite is also apprehensible as an entirely antimelancholy ''transversality.'' Though in the very process of defining this transversality and attempting to dissociate it from one of the key concepts of Romanticism, Glissant reveals that transversality/creolite has, in fact, entered into a long-distance and long-durational Romantic correspondence: ''And so transversality, and not the universal transcendence of the sublime, has come to light. It took us a long time to learn this. We are the roots of a cross-cultural relationship. . . . We thereby live, we have the good fortune of living, this shared process of cultural mutation, this convergence that frees us from uniformity.'' 21 Creolite-transversality/the sublime: countermode and mode, if we are to believe Glissant, of the modern. But how ''counter'' is this creolite and the transverse difference it makes and safeguards? What, indeed, is it counter to? If the answer is Kant, and that sublimely disinterested philosophical discourse on and of modernity, and that sublimely empty, homogeneous, and globe-traversing theory of the cosmopolitan and the contemporary Foucault has detected in Kant's postrevolutionary historical writings, then creolite is certainly countersublime. 22 But if creolite's sublime interlocutor is not Kant but Wordsworth, then the difference creolite fashions, guards, and names is a decidedly Romantic and sublime countermodernity. This, certainly, will have been apparent to anyone who has even a glancing familiarity with Wordsworth on reading the first sentences from the Texaco passage I have cited:
Penetrating the Doum, I found it deserted. Abandoned. I had been in so many places of Power, that I had acquired an immediate intuition for them. In my daily life, I detected around me so many cultural ruins in our mute countryside, so many gradual mummifications in the land all around, that I could at any point, before a hutch, a spot, a landscape, a river mouth, perceive a historical presence, stricken with staggering wear and tear.
Penetrating the Doum, Chamoiseau's narrator, like Wordsworth on his traipses round England's commons and heaths, discovers in the ''cultural ruins'' of his mute countryside, in these ''stricken'' ''spots'' in the landscape, nevertheless eloquent ''historical presences.'' This might as well be ''Michael'' or ''The Ruined Cottage.'' Certainly it adopts an entirely Wordsworthian reading habit, that same ''strange discipline'' of reading the ''spot of time'' not only as a personal lieux-de-memoire but as a collective historical monument to (the erosion of ) a customary cultural habitus that Wordsworth identified as the project of his postrevolutionary verse in the ''Reconciling Addendum'' to ''The Ruined Cottage.'' 23 Where Wordsworth's ''strange discipline'' locates and seeks to safeguard the ruins of rural Englishness and to train the poet's readers to detect such presences and so to preserve them in the experience of reading (if nowhere else), Chamoiseau discovers the stricken remains of creolite but bequeaths to his readers a common power of recollecting lost difference.
That recollection is also, as Glissant suggests, re-creation and recollection, that the stricken scenes of historical memory and the worn monu-ments to a historical strickenness might imply not only melancholy but the birth of a collectivity only increases the imaginative and sentimental sublimity of such sites of memory. To be sure, the creole sublime is neither universal nor transcendent. It is, as Glissant avers, rooted and locally or regionally transverse, constitutive not of ''the human race at large and all at once'' (as Kant has it) but of what Benedict Anderson calls a ''bound'' (rather than an ''unbound'') seriality, a nontotalizing but still (re)collective mode of inhabiting difference. 24 If this too is Romantic, if, indeed, this is the Romantic difference creolite makes and belatedly recollects for postmodernity, then it is, nevertheless, a historically situated rather than a historically nostalgic Romanticism. Or, perhaps, it is a situational nostalgia that by the very specificity and limit of its arena of address reminds us that romantic anticapitalism or Romantic countermodernity is not necessarily nostalgic, precisely because it exists not merely to recollect prior (lost) historical struggles but to collect the energy by which to engage and possibly counter the ongoing advance of a still unevenly developed and not yet universally distributed Enlightenment modernity. Wordsworthian or creole, proper or spectral, Romanticism thus appears and reappears on the contested margins of modernity to remind us that like the ghost, or like Romanticism itself, modernity is also unfinished business.
I have been suggesting that creolite, like Romanticism, is countermodern. Let me now revise that opinion. Creolite, like Romanticism, is not countermodern, it is paradigmatically modern, paradigmatic of modernity's internal countermodernity, paradigmatic, perhaps, of what Jürgen Habermas calls ''Romantic Modernity.'' 25 This is so in any number of ways, but just two that I want to stress, the first of which Srinivas Aravamudan's ''Colonial Logic of Late Romanticism'' makes clear. The ''where'' of Aravamudan's late Romanticism (or, as he also calls it, of a ''supplementary'' or ''prosthetic,'' phantom-limb Romanticism) is not Caribbean but Indian. But what he discovers in the ''Guru English'' of late-nineteenth-and earlytwentieth-century Indian Romanticism is also true of Chamoiseau's and Glissant's creolite: it is simultaneously a practice of, or an elegy for, difference, and a cosmopolitanism, perhaps even, as Glissant notes of creolite in The Poetics of Relation, one of the dominant forms of a contemporary cosmopolitanism. Metissage; hybridity; creolite; Aravamudan's ''Guru English'': these are as cosmopolitan as is currently gets. Reduced to a slogan, the postmodern (as Jameson puts it in the work that stands as Aravamudan's allu-sive intertext) is that in which ''difference relates.'' To which we can imagine Glissant responding: as it is that in which ''relation differs.'' Either way, as Aravamudan demonstrates, if the related differences of the globally subaltern variants of a late Romanticism engage and contest the modern at the level of what Partha Chatterjee calls the problematic (if, that is, they reverse modernity's core market of values by determining to value rather than to exchange or annul difference) they nevertheless risk doing so in such a way as to confirm modernity's cosmopolitan thematic, fashioning for the present a comprehensively global relationship of related differences. 26 There is, after all, no more global, no more universal, no more cosmopolitan token of cultural value, now, than the adulterated coin of mixed difference. And this too is Romanticism, a Romanticism gone global, a cosmopolitan Romanticism.
But if Romantic difference is thus apprehensible as the future rather than the antithesis of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, then there is another way in which the Romantic, the creole, and the circum-Atlantic slave past, constitutive of the difference creolite properly names, are paradigmatically and long-durationally modern. The subtitle of Gilroy's The Black Atlantic is Modernity and Double Consciousness. While there is a vast argument in that subtitle there is only one point I wish to draw from it, the point with which Gilroy concludes his text. The condition of the slave, Gilroy suggests, is not only to be ''in but not of '' modernity. The transatlantic experience of enslavement is also, in its most intense, accelerated, and brutalizing form, the condition of modernity. As a way of naming the transition from a customary, ''traditional,'' largely rural and agrarian habitus (what Pierre Nora calls an ''environment of memory'') to the mechanized, the hyperbureacratized, the instrumentalized, and the devernacularized, modernity, Gilroy argues, is nowhere more evident, nowhere more rapid, and nowhere more totalizing than in the experience of Africans drawn into the capital machinery of the Atlantic world system (''It is being suggested that the concentrated intensity of the slave experience is something that marked out blacks as the first truly modern people''). 27
The wide range of slavery-derived metaphors used for describing the condition of modern industrial labor in eighteenth-and nineteenth-century social theory is, on this account, more and less than gratuitous. For while the analogies between, say, slavery and wage-slavery do not hold in any number of crucial ways, such figures do capture the fundamental experience of dispossession and alienation common to both the industrial laborer and the plantation slave. And to the extent that Romanticism devotes its energies to protesting, and finding some space of retreat from, such experiences of dispossession, to the extent, that is, that it offers at least an imaginative refuge from the hegemony of modern European and circum-Atlantic capital, it is both in and paradigmatically of modernity. But what sort of retreat does Romanticism provide the dispossessed and their sentimental and vicariously dispossessed allies? The melancholy of lost difference for one. But that, clearly, is not all. And in concluding I want to consider at least one other ''loophole of retreat'' that Romanticism recurrently writes into the long code of modernity.
Recall that Turned by the gloom in upon itself, the poet's mind encounters both its own ''indolent vacuity of thought,'' its ''unthinking'' thoughtfulness, and, as Goodman stresses, a world outside that presses in on the ''bars,'' window, or ''loophole'' of this retreat in the form of a ''stranger's near approach.'' Turning in upon itself, in other words, the ''indolent'' mind of Romanticism here finds a space from within which to open itself out onto the world: and not just any world but a world of approaching strangers, a nonfamiliar, noninsular, nonsolipsistic world of others at the window. But what strangers? For Cowper, Goodman argues, the approaching strangers are the subjects of empire brought to the poet's attention by the newspapers he was addicted to reading. And if ''the mind that contemplates these things'' is that stranger's mind? If the eye peeping out through the ''loophole of retreat'' is the eye of a slave or of a colonial subject? What will he or she see? Or, as a still more basic question: Does that subject, that stranger, even have access to such a retreat, such a space of unthinking thoughtfulness, such a ''parlour'' of indolence?
As has been repeatedly observed, and as Michael Hanchard has made particularly clear, black experiences of disenfranchisement across and throughout the spaces of the British empire and the transatlantic diaspora have regu-larly been predicated not only on the denial of civil or political rights but on an extensive, sometimes a total appropriation of the black subject's time. Denied possession of their own bodies, slaves, and to a lesser extent colonial subjects, and, to an almost equal extent, black South Africans under apartheid, were also not allowed to own their ''own'' time. The ''struggle for the appropriation of time,'' particularly '' 'free time' . . . time that was not accounted for'' thus becomes, Hanchard argues, one of the characteristic forms of political struggle in the making of what he calls an alternate ''AfroModernity,'' much as such struggles, by E. P. Thompson's account, became a central component of the political consciousness of the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century English working class. 29 Indolence-an extent or ''spot'' of free time, the opportunity to find oneself ''still in thought''-thus looks very different for the working-class wage laborer, the slave, or the apartheidera black South African than it might for Cowper at his Olney retreat. Or perhaps I should say it means something different, for at least in the two examples I have provided, the ''spot of (free) time'' in apartheid South Africa and Jacobs's indolent and gloomy retreat from ''where slavery existed,'' look remarkably like Cowper's retreat into ''parlour twilight. '' In the South African case, the teacher who is the central character of Ndebele's Fools has spent a day of quiet civil disobedience, at the advice of a young student radical, marking the ''Day of the Covenant'' (the Nationalist government's commemoration of a nineteenth-century Boer victory over a Zulu army) by retiring to his bedroom for a ''day of thinking.'' But like Cowper his mind proves vacant of all but a consciousness of the luxury of its own purposeless activity and a fanciful cinema of impressions, until he, too, is brought back to the world by the approach of a stranger: ''Since I had told myself it was the day for thinking, I had willed myself to think: but my mind had been unable to focus on any specific thing. I had willed without direction. And I had become aware that I did not really know how to think; how to induce the mind to work; that it was really possible to be dedicated without any real aims to be conscious of. . . . Thinking about thinking, I had been thinking. I had smiled and then closed my eyes and tried to think about something concrete. Nothing came but colours: red, white, blue, green, and black flashing across the screen of my closed eyes. For such a long time. Was I thinking or not? Was I asleep or awake? It was the light knock at the door that brought me to full consciousness.''
The structural parallel is almost exact, though Ndeble's character seems both relaxed and troubled by his indolent vacuity of thought, or perhaps simply more impatient for his free time also to be the time of the ''stranger's near approach.'' That stranger does, of course, materialize, though not in the form of a long-distance other but in the guise of a child (''the thing I should have been thinking of '') whose slight frame, like the shadowy outline of Cowper's stranger, nevertheless manages to embody ''such a large part of the world just behind him, for he was bigger than it, and had blotted most of it out with his body. His presence there seemed to be the beginning of questions.'' What those questions are, and what their answers might be, I do not have space here to address, so let me mention just one of the questions that boy brings with him as he brings the world into the space of the room: the question of the ''child.'' It is the teacher's troubled conviction that children are, and should remain, strangers; strangers, that is, to the world of adults, particularly the adult worlds of sexuality and politics. That conviction is troubled because as an educator his task is to prepare children for the adult world, a generally commended vocational calling but one, in apartheid South Africa, that seems to him like an exercise in cruelty, a project of issuing children into an adult world that will have no place for them and in which they will increasingly be forced to live as the race-strangers they do not yet understand themselves to be. Complicit in depriving the children of the political innocence he wants to preserve (but which his activist foil informs him is nothing but an indulgent, romantic fantasy), the teacher is also complicit with a sexual betrayal of childhood ''innocence.'' Years earlier, he had slept with one of his students, a young girl he had known since her early childhood and whom he now torments himself for not keeping a sexual stranger to himself. That children are and should remain strangers to the world of adults is, of course, as the political activist in Ndebele's story contends, a Romantic notion, indeed, as Frances Ferguson indicates in her essay in this collection, one of the chief and more enduring articles of Romantic and Romantically liberal faith over the long history of modernity. That the Romantic child is still with us; that these are the representational strangers most commonly in our midst; that there is a Romantic politics whose task is to think the difference children make; that this is a matter of interest not only for a European intellectual elite but for the global subaltern, for those such as Ndebele's black South Africans who must find some retreat from apartheid, some spot of free time in which to be still in thought if they are to be able to recollect what, in addition to national politics, they (we) ''should be thinking of ''; that all these are also ways in which Romanticism marks its life and afterlives seems evident and, to me at least, not at all an entirely unwelcome disruption of period unities. Harriet Jacobs was also thinking of children in her retreat. Indeed, as she indicates, she bored her hole through the wall of her grandmother's garret, cut out that loophole in her retreat, chiefly in the hope of catching sight or hearing the voices of her children, who were living with her grandmother in the house across the yard. The tactic worked. She saw and heard her children. But letting in that world of children also let in the wider world outside, while also casting her mind back on the gloomily majestic range of its own cramped indolence. Looking for and brooding on her children, Jacobs also broods, with typical understatement and appropriately pragmatic anxiety, on her mind's own grandeur of historical survey (''O, those long gloomy days, with no object for my eye to rest upon, and no thoughts to occupy my mind, except the dreary past and the uncertain future!''). But engloomed, like Cowper, within its own universe-in-a-nutshell space of cognitive retreat, Jacobs's mind, like Cowper's, also finds in gloomy retreat the occasion for qualified intellectual delight.
The light admitted through her borehole, Jacobs indicates, was not only sufficient to allow her to look out but adequate to permit her to read within (''My eyes had become accustomed to the dim light, and by holding my book or work in a certain position near the aperture I contrived to read''). 30 I do not know what book Jacobs was reading by her loophole of retreat, but I like to think that the words illumined on the page were Cowper's words; that it was while reading The Task that she set herself the task of entering into a delayed and long-distance Romantic correspondence and of casting for us the reflective, ghostly afterlight of her reading on Cowper's text; that peeping from one loophole of retreat to another she could imagine Cowper as the stranger making his nearer approach to her gloomy confinement while she became the stranger more nearly approaching Cowper's window on history. However fanciful the conceit, it occurs to me that it is precisely of such historical ''fanc[ies] ludicrous and wild'' that Cowper's own loophole was made and that, whether or not she was reading Cowper in her grandmother's garret, such a Romantic loophole of retreat was indeed, one of ''the last places'' in which her pursuers would have thought-or we her belated readers have thought-to find an enslaved black woman, ''still in thought'' and ''free as ever.'' If for Jacobs, a century and a half ago, there were indeed ''no'' or few ''[other] places, where slavery existed, that could have afforded . . . so good a place of concealment,'' then for us, now, it is perhaps time to start examining this and other such places in which, over the course of the past two centuries, Romanticism has gone into such cannily recreational (and recreational) hiding. The essays that follow do not exhaust that task. But their presence here suggests, at the very least, the beginning, again, of questions.
